Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction,9780521315937

Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction

by
ISBN13: 9780521315937
ISBN10: 052131593X
Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 1986-09-26
Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press
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Summary

This book integrates political theory and mathematical models of political and economic processes.

Table of Contents

Preface ix
Acknowledgments xv
Individual preference and individual choice
1(52)
Some fundamental notation and definitions
2(8)
Actions
3(1)
Outcomes
4(5)
States of nature
9(1)
Preferences
10(6)
The preference relation
12(1)
Ordinal utility
13(3)
Multiattribute outcomes
16(12)
Decision making under certainty
28(9)
Constrained economic decisions
29(3)
Constrained political decisions
32(5)
Decision making under risk
37(5)
The meaning of cardinal utility
42(6)
Cardinal utility and subjective probability
48(3)
Allais's paradox
48(1)
The calculus of voting
49(2)
Summary
51(2)
Individual preference and social choice
53(44)
Arrow's impossibility result
56(9)
Paradoxes of voting
65(6)
The agenda paradox
65(1)
The contrived Condorcet paradox
66(1)
The dominated-winner paradox
67(1)
The inverted-order paradox
68(1)
The winner-turns-loser paradox
69(1)
The truncated point-total paradox
70(1)
The majority-winner paradox
70(1)
The power of agendas
71(11)
Misrepresentation of preferences
82(7)
Vote trading
89(5)
Summary
94(3)
Basic theory of noncooperative games
97(47)
Noncooperative games: an example
98(1)
Games in extensive form: the game tree
99(7)
Strategy and the normal form
106(6)
Normal form of infinite games
112(2)
Best-response strategies and domination
114(3)
Pure-strategy equilibria
117(3)
Some conditions for existence of pure-strategy equilibria
120(13)
Games of perfect information
120(1)
Some simple voting games
121(6)
Concave---convex games and the fundamental theorem
127(6)
Mixed strategies
133(4)
Perfect equilibria
137(5)
Summary
142(2)
Elections and two-person zero-sum games
144(59)
Zero-sum games
144(2)
Interchangeability and equivalence
146(3)
Maxmin and minmax
149(5)
Concave games and resource allocations in elections
154(4)
Symmetric games and candidate objectives
158(2)
Two-candidate elections with a single issue
160(6)
Two-candidate multidimensional elections
166(9)
Disequilibrium with income redistribution policies
175(5)
Mixed strategies and the uncovered set in elections
180(7)
Rational expectations and voter ignorance
187(9)
N-person zero-sum games
196(4)
Summary
200(3)
Nonzero-sum games: political economy, public goods, and the prisoners' dilemma
203(40)
Nonzero-sum games
203(3)
The two-person prisoners' dilemma
206(4)
Public goods and externalities
210(5)
An analogous game with a continuum of strategies
215(5)
Other prisoners' dilemmas
220(15)
Arms races
221(1)
Interest groups and collective action
222(3)
Political participation
225(8)
Vote trading
233(2)
Demand-revealing mechanisms
235(6)
Summary
241(2)
Institutions, strategic voting, and agendas
243(59)
Sincere voting, issue by issue
245(12)
Sophisticated voting, issue by issue
257(6)
The disappearance of stability without separability
263(3)
Sophisticated voting and agendas
266(18)
Binary agendas
267(4)
Amendment agendas
271(10)
Congressional agendas
281(2)
Partially sophisticated committees
283(1)
Some experimental and empirical evidence
284(7)
Incomplete information and sophisticated voting
291(7)
Summary
298(4)
Cooperative games and the characteristic function
302(37)
Strong equilibria
304(2)
The characteristic function, v(C)
306(7)
Simple games
313(4)
The special case of transferable utility
317(5)
Some examples of characteristic-function games
322(8)
The valley of the dump
322(1)
Normalized games
322(3)
Market games
325(1)
Pollution, externalities, and the prisoners' dilemma
325(5)
Alternative forms of v(C)
330(2)
Ambiguities in v(C)
332(5)
Summary
337(2)
The core
339(48)
The core
340(5)
The core and Pareto-optimality
345(4)
Transferable utility games
349(6)
Transferable utility and the core
349(4)
The Coase theorem
353(2)
Balanced games
355(6)
A necessary and sufficient condition for existence
355(2)
Market games
357(4)
Committees with a single issue
361(3)
An extended example: the Genossenschaften
364(6)
Multiple dimensions and some experimental evidence
370(6)
Logrolling and some experimental ambiguities
376(2)
Extraordinary majorities
378(4)
The core and ambiguities with v(C)
382(2)
Summary
384(3)
Solution theory
387(54)
The stable set
389(4)
Some properties of V-sets
393(5)
Relationship of V to the core
393(1)
Existence and uniqueness of V
394(4)
Bargaining sets for simple voting games
398(4)
Cooperative vs. noncooperative analysis of committees
402(2)
Extensions of the bargaining set
404(4)
The size principle
408(6)
Problems with nontransferable utility games
414(4)
The competitive solution
418(8)
Some experimental evidence
426(8)
Spatial committees
426(1)
Weighted voting systems
427(4)
Vote trading
431(1)
Experimental anomalies
432(2)
A noncooperative view and alternative ideas
434(3)
Summary
437(4)
Repeated games and information: some research frontiers
441(44)
The repeated prisoners' dilemma
442(6)
The balance of power
448(3)
A finitely repeated game: the chain store paradox
451(11)
The Shapley value and the power index
462(8)
The Nash bargaining model
470(5)
Relating the Shapley value to Nash's scheme
475(3)
Reciprocity and repeated games
478(5)
Summary
483(2)
References and a guide to the literature 485(16)
Index 501

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