
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Daron Acemoglu , James A. Robinson-
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Summary
Table of Contents
Preface | p. xi |
Questions and Answers | |
Paths of Political Development | p. 1 |
Britain | p. 2 |
Argentina | p. 5 |
Singapore | p. 8 |
South Africa | p. 10 |
The Agenda | p. 14 |
Our Argument | p. 15 |
Democracy versus Nondemocracy | p. 16 |
Building Blocks of Our Approach | p. 19 |
Toward Our Basic Story | p. 22 |
Our Theory of Democratization | p. 23 |
Democratic Consolidation | p. 30 |
Determinants of Democracy | p. 31 |
Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict | p. 42 |
Democracy in a Picture | p. 43 |
Overview of the Book | p. 46 |
What Do We Know about Democracy? | p. 48 |
Measuring Democracy | p. 48 |
Patterns of Democracy | p. 51 |
Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution | p. 58 |
Crises and Democracy | p. 65 |
Social Unrest and Democratization | p. 65 |
The Literature | p. 75 |
Our Contribution | p. 80 |
Modeling Politics | |
Democratic Politics | p. 89 |
Introduction | p. 89 |
Aggregating Individual Preferences | p. 91 |
Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem | p. 92 |
Our Workhorse Models | p. 99 |
Democracy and Political Equality | p. 113 |
Conclusion | p. 117 |
Nondemocratic Politics | p. 118 |
Introduction | p. 118 |
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics | p. 120 |
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies | p. 128 |
Commitment Problems | p. 133 |
A Simple Game of Promises | p. 144 |
A Dynamic Model | p. 151 |
Incentive-Compatible Promises | p. 161 |
Conclusion | p. 171 |
The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy | |
Democratization | p. 173 |
Introduction | p. 173 |
The Role of Political Institutions | p. 173 |
Preferences over Political Institutions | p. 176 |
Political Power and Institutions | p. 177 |
A Static Model of Democratization | p. 181 |
Democratization or Repression? | p. 186 |
A Dynamic Model of Democratization | p. 193 |
Subgame Perfect Equilibria | p. 201 |
Alternative Political Identities | p. 203 |
Targeted Transfers | p. 207 |
Power of the Elites in Democracy | p. 207 |
Ideological Preferences over Regimes | p. 211 |
Democratization in a Picture | p. 214 |
Equilibrium Revolutions | p. 215 |
Conclusion | p. 218 |
Coups and Consolidation | p. 221 |
Introduction | p. 221 |
Incentives for Coups | p. 224 |
A Static Model of Coups | p. 225 |
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy | p. 231 |
Alternative Political Identities | p. 246 |
Targeted Transfers | p. 246 |
Power in Democracy and Coups | p. 247 |
Consolidation in a Picture | p. 249 |
Defensive Coups | p. 251 |
Conclusion | p. 253 |
Putting the Models to Work | |
The Role of the Middle Class | p. 255 |
Introduction | p. 255 |
The Three-Class Model | p. 259 |
Emergence of Partial Democracy | p. 262 |
From Partial to Full Democracy | p. 267 |
Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer | p. 273 |
Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners | p. 278 |
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy | p. 283 |
Conclusion | p. 285 |
Economic Structure and Democracy | p. 287 |
Introduction | p. 287 |
Economic Structure and Income Distribution | p. 290 |
Political Conflict | p. 292 |
Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy | p. 293 |
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land | p. 296 |
Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy | p. 300 |
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists | p. 307 |
Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice | p. 312 |
Economic Institutions | p. 313 |
Human Capital | p. 316 |
Conjectures about Political Development | p. 317 |
Conclusion | p. 319 |
Globalization and Democracy | p. 321 |
Introduction | p. 321 |
A Model of an Open Economy | p. 325 |
Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation | p. 331 |
Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy | p. 334 |
Financial Integration | p. 338 |
Increased Political Integration | p. 343 |
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade | p. 344 |
Conclusion | p. 347 |
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | |
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy | p. 349 |
Paths of Political Development Revisited | p. 349 |
Extensions and Areas for Future Research | p. 355 |
The Future of Democracy | p. 358 |
Appendix | |
Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy | p. 361 |
Introduction | p. 361 |
Probabilistic Voting Models | p. 361 |
Lobbying | p. 367 |
Partisan Politics and Political Capture | p. 373 |
Bibliography | p. 381 |
Index | p. 401 |
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