List of Authors |
|
xv | |
1 What is Corporate Law? |
|
1 | (20) |
|
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman |
|
|
|
|
1 | (4) |
|
1.2 What is a corporation? |
|
|
5 | (10) |
|
|
6 | (2) |
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
1.2.3 Transferable shares |
|
|
10 | (1) |
|
1.2.4 Delegated management with a board structure |
|
|
11 | (2) |
|
|
13 | (2) |
|
1.3 What does corporate law include? |
|
|
15 | (2) |
|
1.3.1 Secondary and partial corporations forms |
|
|
15 | (1) |
|
1.3.2 Additional sources of corporate law |
|
|
16 | (1) |
|
1.3.3 Non-corporate law constraints |
|
|
17 | (1) |
|
1.4 What is the goal of corporate law? |
|
|
17 | (4) |
2 Agency Problems and Legal Strategies |
|
21 | (12) |
|
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman |
|
|
|
2.1 Three agency problems |
|
|
21 | (2) |
|
2.2 Legal strategies for reducing agency costs |
|
|
23 | (5) |
|
2.2.1 Regulatory strategies |
|
|
23 | (3) |
|
2.2.2 Governance strategies |
|
|
26 | (1) |
|
2.2.3 Ex post and ex ante strategies |
|
|
27 | (1) |
|
2.3 Legal strategies in corporate context |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
|
29 | (4) |
3 The Basic Governance Structure |
|
33 | (38) |
|
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman |
|
|
|
3.1 How governance strategies protect shareholders as a class |
|
|
33 | (21) |
|
3.1.1 The appointment rights strategy |
|
|
34 | (12) |
|
3.1.2 The other strategies: Decision rights, trusteeship, incentives, constraints, and affiliation rights |
|
|
46 | (8) |
|
3.2 Protecting minority shareholders |
|
|
54 | (7) |
|
3.2.1 The appointment rights strategy |
|
|
54 | (3) |
|
3.2.2 The decision rights strategy |
|
|
57 | (1) |
|
3.2.3 The trusteeship strategy |
|
|
57 | (2) |
|
3.2.4 The reward, constraints, and affiliation rights strategies |
|
|
59 | (1) |
|
3.2.5 Reflecting on the minority-majority shareholder conflict |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
3.3 Protecting non-shareholder constituencies |
|
|
61 | (6) |
|
3.3.1 The appointment rights strategy |
|
|
62 | (3) |
|
3.3.2 The trusteeship strategy |
|
|
65 | (1) |
|
3.3.3 The constraints strategy |
|
|
66 | (1) |
|
3.4 Patterns of corporate governance |
|
|
67 | (4) |
4 Creditor Protection |
|
71 | (30) |
|
Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda |
|
|
|
4.1 Why should corporate law protect creditors? |
|
|
71 | (6) |
|
4.1.1 Companies in the vicinity of insolvency |
|
|
73 | (1) |
|
|
74 | (2) |
|
4.1.3 Involuntary creditors |
|
|
76 | (1) |
|
4.2 Regulatory strategies for creditor protection |
|
|
77 | (20) |
|
4.2.1 Mandatory disclosure-The entry strategy |
|
|
79 | (4) |
|
4.2.2 Rules governing legal capital and corporate groups |
|
|
83 | (5) |
|
4.2.3 Fiduciary duties-The standards strategy |
|
|
88 | (9) |
|
4.3 Explaining differences in creditor protection |
|
|
97 | (4) |
|
4.3.1 The extent of divergence |
|
|
97 | (1) |
|
4.3.2 The importance of divergence |
|
|
98 | (3) |
5 Related Party Transactions |
|
101 | (30) |
|
Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda |
|
|
|
5.1 Conflicted transactions by managers |
|
|
101 | (17) |
|
5.1.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy |
|
|
103 | (2) |
|
5.1.2 Disinterested board approval: The trusteeship strategy |
|
|
105 | (4) |
|
5.1.3 Shareholder voting: The decision rights strategy |
|
|
109 | (2) |
|
5.1.4 Prohibiting conflicted transactions: The rules strategy |
|
|
111 | (3) |
|
5.1.5 The duty of loyalty: The standards strategy |
|
|
114 | (4) |
|
5.2 Transactions involving controlling shareholders |
|
|
118 | (10) |
|
5.2.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy |
|
|
119 | (2) |
|
5.2.2 Board and shareholder ratification: The trusteeship and decision rights strategies |
|
|
121 | (2) |
|
5.2.3 Fiduciary duties and fairness norms: The standards strategy |
|
|
123 | (5) |
|
5.3 Explaining differences in the regulation of related party transactions |
|
|
128 | (3) |
6 Significant Corporate Actions |
|
131 | (26) |
|
Edward Rock, Hideki Kanda and Reinier Kraakman |
|
|
|
6.1 What are significant corporate actions? |
|
|
131 | (2) |
|
6.2 Mergers and similar organic changes |
|
|
133 | (12) |
|
6.2.1 The management-shareholder conflict |
|
|
133 | (6) |
|
6.2.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict |
|
|
139 | (5) |
|
6.2.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
|
145 | (1) |
|
6.4 Legal capital, share issues, and corporate distributions |
|
|
145 | (6) |
|
6.4.1 The manager-shareholder conflict |
|
|
146 | (1) |
|
6.4.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict |
|
|
147 | (4) |
|
6.4.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies |
|
|
151 | (1) |
|
6.5 Fully delegated decisions: Investment and debt |
|
|
151 | (2) |
|
6.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of significant corporate actions |
|
|
153 | (4) |
7 Control Transactions |
|
157 | (36) |
|
Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt |
|
|
|
7.1 Agency problems in control transactions |
|
|
157 | (6) |
|
7.1.1 Control transactions |
|
|
157 | (2) |
|
|
159 | (4) |
|
7.2 Agency problems where shareholdings are dispersed: Two models of regulation |
|
|
163 | (10) |
|
|
163 | (1) |
|
7.2.2 The first model: Non-frustration of the offer |
|
|
164 | (4) |
|
7.2.3 The second model: Directors controlling access to the shareholders |
|
|
168 | (2) |
|
7.2.4 Rationales for the second model |
|
|
170 | (2) |
|
7.2.5 Comparing the two models |
|
|
172 | (1) |
|
7.3 Agency problems of dispersed shareholders when a general offer is made |
|
|
173 | (11) |
|
7.3.1 Information asymmetry: The affiliation strategy |
|
|
174 | (2) |
|
7.3.2 Pressure to accept the offer: The reward strategy |
|
|
176 | (2) |
|
7.3.3 The mandatory bid rule: The exit strategy |
|
|
178 | (3) |
|
|
181 | (2) |
|
7.3.5 Acquisition of dissenting minorities |
|
|
183 | (1) |
|
7.4 Agency issues where there are controlling shareholders |
|
|
184 | (3) |
|
7.5 Agency problems of non-shareholder groups |
|
|
187 | (2) |
|
7.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of control transactions |
|
|
189 | (4) |
8 Issuers and Investor Protection |
|
193 | (22) |
|
Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman and Edward Rock |
|
|
|
8.1 Two objectives of investor protection |
|
|
194 | (1) |
|
8.2 The entry strategy: Mandatory disclosure |
|
|
195 | (12) |
|
8.2.1 Jurisdictional variations |
|
|
197 | (4) |
|
8.2.2 Accounting methodology |
|
|
201 | (1) |
|
8.2.3 Exiting disclosure requirements |
|
|
202 | (2) |
|
8.2.4 Why make disclosure mandatory? |
|
|
204 | (3) |
|
8.3 Quality control: The trusteeship strategy |
|
|
207 | (1) |
|
8.4 Quality control: The rules and standards strategies |
|
|
208 | (4) |
|
|
209 | (1) |
|
8.4.2 The standards strategy |
|
|
210 | (2) |
|
8.5 Explaining differences in investor protection |
|
|
212 | (3) |
9 Beyond the Anatomy |
|
215 | (12) |
|
Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig and Klaus Hopt |
|
|
|
|
215 | (2) |
|
9.2 Putting our results into context |
|
|
217 | (1) |
|
9.3 Existing commonalities |
|
|
218 | (4) |
|
|
218 | (3) |
|
9.3.2 Causes of remaining divergence |
|
|
221 | (1) |
|
9.4 Roadmap for further research |
|
|
222 | (5) |
Index |
|
227 | |