The Anatomy of Corporate Law A Comparative and Functional Approach

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Format: Paperback
Pub. Date: 2004-05-20
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
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Summary

This book is a concise analytical overview of the field of corporate law. The authors start from the premise that corporate (or company) law across jurisdictions addresses the same three basic agency problems: (1) the opportunism of managers vis-à-vis shareholders; (2) the opportunism of controlling shareholders vis-à-vis minority shareholders; and (3) the opportunism of shareholders as a class vis-à-vis other corporate constituencies, such as corporate creditors and employees. Every jurisdiction must address these problems in a variety of contexts framed by the corporation's internal dynamics and its interactions with the product, labor, capital, and takeover markets. The authors' central claim, however, is that corporate (or company) forms are fundamentally similar and that, to a surprising degree, jurisdictions pick from among the same handful of legal strategies--although not always the same strategy--to address the three basic agency issues. This book explains in detail how (and why) the principal European jurisdictions, Japan, and the United States sometimes select identical legal strategies to address a given corporate law problem, and sometimes make divergent choices. After an introductory discussion of agency issues and legal strategies, the book addresses the basic governance structure of the corporation, including the powers of the board of directors and the shareholders meeting. It proceeds to creditor protection measures, related-party transactions, and fundamental corporate actions such as mergers and charter amendments. Finally, it concludes with an examination of friendly acquisitions, hostile takeovers, and the regulation of the capital markets. This book should be of great interest to scholars and students of corporate and comparative law and to persons interested in business, finance, and economics who wish to deepen their understanding of corporate law.

Author Biography


Reinier Kraakman is a Professor at Harvard Law School. Paul Davies is a Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Henry Hansmann is a Professor at Yale Law School. Gerard Hertig is a Professor at the Swiss Institute of Technology. Klaus J. Hopt is Director of the Max-Planck Institute Hamburg. Hideki Kanda is a Professor at University of Tokyo Faculty of Law. Edward B. Rock is a Professor at University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Table of Contents

List of Authors xv
1 What is Corporate Law? 1(20)
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
1.1 Introduction
1(4)
1.2 What is a corporation?
5(10)
1.2.1 Legal personality
6(2)
1.2.2 Limited liability
8(2)
1.2.3 Transferable shares
10(1)
1.2.4 Delegated management with a board structure
11(2)
1.2.5 Investor ownership
13(2)
1.3 What does corporate law include?
15(2)
1.3.1 Secondary and partial corporations forms
15(1)
1.3.2 Additional sources of corporate law
16(1)
1.3.3 Non-corporate law constraints
17(1)
1.4 What is the goal of corporate law?
17(4)
2 Agency Problems and Legal Strategies 21(12)
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
2.1 Three agency problems
21(2)
2.2 Legal strategies for reducing agency costs
23(5)
2.2.1 Regulatory strategies
23(3)
2.2.2 Governance strategies
26(1)
2.2.3 Ex post and ex ante strategies
27(1)
2.3 Legal strategies in corporate context
28(1)
2.4 The role of law
29(4)
3 The Basic Governance Structure 33(38)
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman
3.1 How governance strategies protect shareholders as a class
33(21)
3.1.1 The appointment rights strategy
34(12)
3.1.2 The other strategies: Decision rights, trusteeship, incentives, constraints, and affiliation rights
46(8)
3.2 Protecting minority shareholders
54(7)
3.2.1 The appointment rights strategy
54(3)
3.2.2 The decision rights strategy
57(1)
3.2.3 The trusteeship strategy
57(2)
3.2.4 The reward, constraints, and affiliation rights strategies
59(1)
3.2.5 Reflecting on the minority-majority shareholder conflict
60(1)
3.3 Protecting non-shareholder constituencies
61(6)
3.3.1 The appointment rights strategy
62(3)
3.3.2 The trusteeship strategy
65(1)
3.3.3 The constraints strategy
66(1)
3.4 Patterns of corporate governance
67(4)
4 Creditor Protection 71(30)
Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda
4.1 Why should corporate law protect creditors?
71(6)
4.1.1 Companies in the vicinity of insolvency
73(1)
4.1.2 Corporate groups
74(2)
4.1.3 Involuntary creditors
76(1)
4.2 Regulatory strategies for creditor protection
77(20)
4.2.1 Mandatory disclosure-The entry strategy
79(4)
4.2.2 Rules governing legal capital and corporate groups
83(5)
4.2.3 Fiduciary duties-The standards strategy
88(9)
4.3 Explaining differences in creditor protection
97(4)
4.3.1 The extent of divergence
97(1)
4.3.2 The importance of divergence
98(3)
5 Related Party Transactions 101(30)
Gerard Hertig and Hideki Kanda
5.1 Conflicted transactions by managers
101(17)
5.1.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy
103(2)
5.1.2 Disinterested board approval: The trusteeship strategy
105(4)
5.1.3 Shareholder voting: The decision rights strategy
109(2)
5.1.4 Prohibiting conflicted transactions: The rules strategy
111(3)
5.1.5 The duty of loyalty: The standards strategy
114(4)
5.2 Transactions involving controlling shareholders
118(10)
5.2.1 Mandatory disclosure: The affiliation strategy
119(2)
5.2.2 Board and shareholder ratification: The trusteeship and decision rights strategies
121(2)
5.2.3 Fiduciary duties and fairness norms: The standards strategy
123(5)
5.3 Explaining differences in the regulation of related party transactions
128(3)
6 Significant Corporate Actions 131(26)
Edward Rock, Hideki Kanda and Reinier Kraakman
6.1 What are significant corporate actions?
131(2)
6.2 Mergers and similar organic changes
133(12)
6.2.1 The management-shareholder conflict
133(6)
6.2.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict
139(5)
6.2.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies
144(1)
6.3 Sales of assets
145(1)
6.4 Legal capital, share issues, and corporate distributions
145(6)
6.4.1 The manager-shareholder conflict
146(1)
6.4.2 The majority-minority shareholder conflict
147(4)
6.4.3 The protection of non-shareholder constituencies
151(1)
6.5 Fully delegated decisions: Investment and debt
151(2)
6.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of significant corporate actions
153(4)
7 Control Transactions 157(36)
Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt
7.1 Agency problems in control transactions
157(6)
7.1.1 Control transactions
157(2)
7.1.2 Agency issues
159(4)
7.2 Agency problems where shareholdings are dispersed: Two models of regulation
163(10)
7.2.1 Basic models
163(1)
7.2.2 The first model: Non-frustration of the offer
164(4)
7.2.3 The second model: Directors controlling access to the shareholders
168(2)
7.2.4 Rationales for the second model
170(2)
7.2.5 Comparing the two models
172(1)
7.3 Agency problems of dispersed shareholders when a general offer is made
173(11)
7.3.1 Information asymmetry: The affiliation strategy
174(2)
7.3.2 Pressure to accept the offer: The reward strategy
176(2)
7.3.3 The mandatory bid rule: The exit strategy
178(3)
7.3.4 Competing bids
181(2)
7.3.5 Acquisition of dissenting minorities
183(1)
7.4 Agency issues where there are controlling shareholders
184(3)
7.5 Agency problems of non-shareholder groups
187(2)
7.6 Explaining differences in the regulation of control transactions
189(4)
8 Issuers and Investor Protection 193(22)
Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman and Edward Rock
8.1 Two objectives of investor protection
194(1)
8.2 The entry strategy: Mandatory disclosure
195(12)
8.2.1 Jurisdictional variations
197(4)
8.2.2 Accounting methodology
201(1)
8.2.3 Exiting disclosure requirements
202(2)
8.2.4 Why make disclosure mandatory?
204(3)
8.3 Quality control: The trusteeship strategy
207(1)
8.4 Quality control: The rules and standards strategies
208(4)
8.4.1 The rules strategy
209(1)
8.4.2 The standards strategy
210(2)
8.5 Explaining differences in investor protection
212(3)
9 Beyond the Anatomy 215(12)
Paul Davies, Gerard Hertig and Klaus Hopt
9.1 Our approach
215(2)
9.2 Putting our results into context
217(1)
9.3 Existing commonalities
218(4)
9.3.1 Robustness
218(3)
9.3.2 Causes of remaining divergence
221(1)
9.4 Roadmap for further research
222(5)
Index 227

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